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COMMENT
TURNER BROADCASTING V. FCC: A FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGE TO CABLE TELEVISION MUST-CARRY RULES
Marc Peritz"
I. INTRODUCTION
"Cable television ... is engaged in 'speech' under the First Amend-
ment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press."" Furthermore,
selection of programming by cable operators involves the exercise of edi-
torial discretion.2 As such, regulations affecting members of the cable tele-
vision industry are subject to First Amendment challenge.
As part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act),3 Congress included provisions mandating
that cable operators devote a portion of their channel capacity to local
broadcast television stations.4 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of these so-called "must-carry" provisions
less than one hour after they became law,' and several other cable operators
and programmers later joined the suit or had their separate actions consoli-
dated into this case.6 A three-judge district court panel upheld the constitu-
tionality of the must-carry requirements.7 On June 27, 1994, however, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court ruling and remanded the case for
further factual development! This was the first opportunity for the Court to
decide what constitutional standard to apply to government restrictions on
the First Amendment rights of cable television operators. 9 The Court decid-
J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary, 1994.
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
2 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 & n.17 (1979).
3 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
4 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. IV 1992).
5 See Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 3, Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44).
6 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Id. at 36. The 1992 Cable Act requires that a three-judge panel hear "any civil
action challenging the constitutionality of' the must-carry requirements, with appeal
lying directly to the Supreme Court. 47 U.S.C. § 555 (Supp. IV 1992).
8 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2472 (1994).
9 The Supreme Court twice previously has denied certiorari to cases declaring un-
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ed that cable television regulations are subject to some degree of heightened
scrutiny" and that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral," but it
was unable to decide whether the provisions survived the applicable level of
scrutiny.'"
This Note will discuss: (1) previous attempts by the federal government
to implement must-carry restrictions on cable television operators; (2) the
must-carry provisions enacted as part of the 1992 Cable Act; (3) the lower
court decision upholding the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of
the 1992 Cable Act; and (4) the Supreme Court decision vacating the deci-
sion below and remanding for further proceedings. This Note then will
argue that the Supreme Court erred in finding the must-carry provisions to
be content-neutral. Nevertheless, analyzed pursuant to that standard, the
provisions violate the First Amendment rights of cable operators and cable
programmers.
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT MUST-CARRY
A. Quincy-A Challenge to the Initial Must-Carry Rules
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began to regulate the
cable television industry in the mid-1960s. 3 The FCC believed that regula-
tion was necessary because it feared that as the cable industry grew, it
would do so at the expense of local broadcast television stations by taking
their audiences and revenues. 4 This could "threaten the economic viability
of broadcast television," and thus "undermine the FCC's mandate to allocate
the broadcast spectrum in a manner that best serve[s] the public interest."' 5
As a result, in 1962 the FCC first sought to protect ordinary broadcast tele-
vision by imposing a must-carry requirement as a condition to constructing
a system to transmit distant television signals to a rural cable system.
6
constitutional past attempts at imposing must-carry requirements on cable operators. See
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
0 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
Id. at 2459-64.
2 Id. at 2472.
'3 For a discussion of the early history of the FCC's regulation of the industry, see
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-67 (1968).
'" See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685, 697-716 (1965) (first
report and order); see also CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (second report and order).
"5 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
16 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aft'd, 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
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This requirement was extended one year later to all cable systems that car-
ried any broadcast signals, regardless of the method used to obtain them.'
7
The must-carry provisions at issue in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC8
varied based on the size of the market in which the cable system operated,
but they generally required a cable system to carry all commercial broadcast
stations within a thirty-five mile radius of the community served by the
cable system, other stations in the same market, and all stations "significant-
ly viewed in the community."' 9 The FCC saw these rules as critical to pre-
venting the "destruction of free, community-oriented television. By forcing
cable systems to carry local and significantly viewed broadcast signals, the
[FCC] sought to channel the growth of cable in a manner consistent with
the public's interest in the preservation of local broadcasting."2
The FCC enacted these rules, however, without proof of their factual
basis, instead relying on its "collective instinct" and intuition." Despite
this, the FCC did not wait to acquire proof because it considered it irrespon-
sible to "withhold[] action until indisputable proof of irreparable damage to
the public interest in television broadcasting has been compiled-i.e., by
waiting 'until the bodies pile up' before conceding that a problem exists."22
Although it fine-tuned the must-carry rules several times before the chal-
lenge in Quincy, the FCC never reconsidered or questioned its speculative
basis for the rules.23
In Quincy, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
declared unconstitutional the must-carry rules.24 The court concluded that
regulation of cable systems should not be reviewed pursuant to the standard
used to review regulations affecting broadcasters. Although declining to
decide which standard to apply, the court held that the must-carry rules
failed even pursuant to the standard used for incidental burdens on speech.26
17 See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1440 n.11 (citing CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d at 725 (second
report and order)).
18 768 F.2d 1434 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
'9 Id. at 1440 n.12.
20 Id. at 1441-42.
2 See id. at 1442 (quoting Inquiry into Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 65 F.C.C.2d 9, 14 (1977)).
22 Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. at 701 (first report and order).
23 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1442.
24 See id. at 1438.
25 See id. at 1449 ("[T]he 'scarcity rationale' has no place in evaluating government
regulation of cable television.").
26 See id. at 1454. An incidental regulation will be upheld if it "furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest ... and if the incidental restriction on alleged first
amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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The court first refused to apply to the must-carry rules the same stan-
dard used to review regulation of broadcast television." The court noted
that broadcasters are due less First Amendment protection than are other
media because of the physical limitation on what can be carried on the
electromagnetic spectrum.28 Unlike broadcast television, however, the court
found that "[t]he [scarcity rationale] cannot be directly applied to cable
television since an essential precondition of that theory-physical interfer-
ence and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent."29
Although broadcast television is limited by airwaves capable of bearing a
limited number of video signals," the channel capacity of cable television
is "almost infinite. ' 3'
The court also refused to analogize to physical scarcity by viewing cable
television as a natural monopoly creating "economic scarcity. 32 The court
viewed this "economic scarcity" argument as unproven, resting on the
doubtful assumption that cable operators are in a position to charge monop-
olistic prices.33 To the extent that cable exhibited monopolistic characteris-
tics at all, the court attributed it to the municipal franchising process rather
than to economic phenomena.34
Having decided that the must-carry provisions should not be reviewed
pursuant to the standard used for broadcast television, the court then ad-
dressed whether they should be treated as incidental burdens on speech
35
2 See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448-50.
28 See id. at 1448 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S.
364, 377 (1984)). This has come to be known as the "scarcity rationale," based on the
fact that the electromagnetic spectrum has a finite capacity. This rationale justifies in-
creased regulation of broadcast television in two ways. First, such regulation actually
furthers, rather than impedes, First Amendment interests because it allows for effective
communication by replacing chaos with structure. See National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943). Governmental control, therefore, prevents
"the cacophony of competing voices" from drowning each other out. Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). Second, "such regulation assures that
broadcasters, privileged occupants of a physically scarce resource, act in a manner
consistent with their status as fiduciaries of the public's interest in responsible use of
the spectrum." Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389).
29 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449.
30 Id. at 1448.
3" Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, The First Amendment
and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (1976).
32 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449-50.
31 Id. at 1450 (citing GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL., CABLESPEECH: THE CASE FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 9-11 (1983)).
34 Id. (citing RICHARD POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MO-
NOPOLY 4 (1970)).
" The court defined "incidental" burdens as "regulations that evince a governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression or protection of a particular set of ideas." Id. at
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and thus analyzed pursuant to O'Brien v. United States36 and Ward v. Rock
Against Racism. 7 Although the court expressed serious reservations as to
whether the must-carry rules should be reviewed as incidental burdens on
speech," it found it unnecessary to reach that question. Instead, the court
ruled that the must-carry rules clearly failed even if reviewed pursuant to the
O'Brien test." The court declined to rule on the substantiality of the
government's asserted interest, as an abstract proposition, in the must-carry
rules.40 Instead, it stated that the FCC had failed to show that the must-
carry rules served to alleviate the presumed threat to the FCC's asserted
interest in preserving free local television service.4 The FCC had not prov-
en that cable television was a threat to local broadcast television; it merely
had assumed it. 2
Regardless of the substantiality of the government's asserted interest, the
court held that the must-carry rules "represent a 'fatally overbroad response'
to the perceived fear that cable will displace free, local television."'" The
must-carry rules sought to protect local broadcasting rather than local broad-
casters, a distinction that the court regarded as critical.' Given the goal of
protecting localism rather than local broadcasters, the court based its ruling
that the must-carry rules were overinclusive on two factors: (1) the rules
protected all local broadcasters regardless of the number of other local out-
lets offered by the cable operator or even whether the local broadcaster
1450.
36 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a description of the O'Brien test imposed on incidental
burdens on speech, see supra note 26.
37 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Ward recast the O'Brien test in similar terms: "[A]n inci-
dental regulation upon speech should be upheld if it promotes a substantial government
interest and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary in order to attain
that interest." See id. at 799.
" Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453 ("[O]ur examination of the purposes that underlie the
must-carry rules, the nature and degree of the intrusions they effect, and prior judicial
treatment of analogous regulations leaves us with serious doubts about the propriety of
applying the standard of review reserved for incidental burdens on speech.").
31 Id. at 1459.
0 Id. For a discussion of the economic assumptions upon which the FCC premised
the must-carry rules, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
41 Qunicy, 768 F.2d at 1459 (stating that the FCC relied on "wholly speculative and
unsubstantiated assumptions").
42 See id. (stating, however, that "[s]hould the [FCC] move beyond its 'more or less
intuitive model,' as it clearly has the capacity to do, we would be extremely hesitant to
second-guess its expert judgment").
43 Id. (citations omitted).
" See id. at 1460. The court made clear that "were the individual broadcasters them-
selves the object of the [FCC]'s favors, the objective itself would be fundamentally
illegitimate." Id.
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carried any local programming;45 and (2) the rules indiscriminately protect-
ed all local broadcasters regardless of their financial health or whether the
cable system actually posed any threat to their economic survival.4 6 These
factors persuaded the court that the must-carry rules, in their current form,
were not tailored narrowly enough to survive review even pursuant to the
O 'Brien test.47
B. The FCC's Response to Quincy
After the must-carry rules were struck down in Quincy, the FCC issued
revised must-carry rules to take effect during a five-year "transitional" peri-
od.48 These rules took into consideration the size of a cable system and the
popularity of a local broadcast station to determine which stations and how
many must be carried by each cable system.49 The FCC believed that these
rules corrected the constitutional inadequacies that caused the previous ver-
sion of the rules to be struck down in Quincy, and that the proper standard
of review was O'Brien because the rules were merely incidental restrictions
on speech.5"
The FCC's constitutional analysis of the revised rules was based on its
view that the proper issue was whether "the regulation is ... designed to
promote or suppress particular viewpoints," rather than to favor a particular
class of speaker.5 This view was based in part upon the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,52 in which the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that banned adult theaters in certain neighbor-
hoods.53 Just as the zoning restriction was justified without regard to the
content of the affected speech,54 the FCC believed that the must-carry rules
were justified by the government's interest in promoting a diverse video
marketplace without regard to the particular viewpoint affected." Given
this standard, the FCC argued that its new rules satisfied the test because the
See id.
46 See id. at 1461.
41 See id. at 1463.
48 See In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage
of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864, 887
(1986).
49 See id.
o See id. at 893-94.
5' Id. at 893.
52 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
3 See id. at 54-55.
14 Id. at 47-49 (finding the ordinance content-neutral because it was not based upon
the content of the adult films, but rather upon the "secondary effects" of such films on
the surrounding community).
" In re Amendment of Part 76, 1 F.C.C.R. at 893.
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changes ensured that they were narrowly tailored to minimize the burden
imposed on speech.56
C. Century Communications-A Challenge to the Revised Rules
In Century Communications Corp. v. FCC,57 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the revised must-carry rules were
unconstitutional.5" As in Quincy, the court found that the FCC had failed to
provide the factual predicate to show that the revised rules furthered a "sub-
stantial government interest ... [or were] of brief enough duration to be
considered narrowly tailored so as to satisfy the ... test for incidental re-
strictions on speech."59 Although the must-carry rules were based on the
"assumption that in the absence of must-carry rules, cable companies would
drop local broadcasters, . . . [e]xperience belies that assertion."6 In fact,
the court cited Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice reports
that concluded that "absent must-carry rules, cable systems can be expected
to carry many or most local broadcast stations."61 The court found the jus-
tification for imposing the rules for five years to be "more speculative than
real,"62 and stated that without any evidence to show that a period of five
years was necessary for the rules to accomplish their objectives, the rules
were "too broad to pass muster even under the O'Brien test."63
The court reached this conclusion despite expressly noting that these
revised must-carry rules were "far less sweeping than the regulations [it]
branded as overinclusive in Quincy."' In fact, the court expressly stated
that must-carry rules are not "per se unconstitutional."65 At the end of its
decision, the court declared:
[T]he government must be able to adduce either empirical
support or ... sound reasoning on behalf of its measures. As
in Quincy Cable TV, we reluctantly conclude that the FCC
has not done so in this case, but instead has failed to "'put
itself in a position to know' whether the problem that its
56 See id. at 894.
7 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
5 Id. at 304.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 303.
61 Id. (quoting In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864,
871 (1986)).
62 Id. at 300.
63 Id. at 304.
4 Id. at 299 n.4.
65 Id. at 304.
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regulations seek 'to solve is a real or fanciful threat."'66
This admonition to get support for its conclusions set the stage for the
government's next attempt at must-carry.
III. MUST-CARRY IN THE 1992 CABLE ACT
A. Details of the Must-Carry Provisions
The must-carry provisions in the 1992 Cable Act are contained primarily
in section 4, dealing with mandatory carriage of local commercial sta-
tions,67 and section 5, dealing with local noncommercial educational sta-
tions.68 Cable systems with twelve or fewer usable activated channels must
carry at least three local commercial stations6 9 and one qualified local non-
commercial educational station.7" Systems with between thirteen and thirty-
six usable activated channels must carry all local commercial stations, up to
one-third of their total channel capacity,7 plus all qualified local noncom-
mercial educational stations, up to a total of three. If no local noncom-
mercial educational stations exist, then cable systems with fewer than thirty-
six usable activated channels must import one.73 Cable systems with more
66 Id. at 304-05 (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1457 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1977)),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986)).
67 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1992). A "local commercial television station" is
defined as "any full power television broadcast station ... licensed and operating on a
channel regularly assigned to its community by the [FCC] that, with respect to a partic-
ular cable system, is within the same television market as the cable system." Id. §
534(h)(1)(A).
68 Id. § 535. A "qualified noncommercial educational television station" is defined as
a station that either: (1) was licensed by the FCC as a noncommercial station as of
March 29, 1990, is owned by a public or nonprofit entity, and is eligible to receive
community service grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting; or (2) "is
owned and operated by a municipality and transmits predominantly noncommercial
programs for educational purposes." Id. § 535(0(1). Predominance is satisfied by devot-
ing at least 50% of the broadcast week to noncommercial programs for educational
purposes. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(a) (1990). Such a station is "local" if either: (1) it is
licensed to a community whose reference point, as defined in 47 C.F.R. § 76.53 (1990),
is within fifty miles of the cable system's principal headend; or (2) its Grade B contour,
as defined in 47 C.F.R. § 73.683(a) (1990), encompasses the cable system's principal
headend. 47 U.S.C. § 535(0(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
69 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(l)(A).
70 Id. § 535(b)(2)(A).
71 Id. § 534(b)(1).
72 Id. § 535(b)(3).
71 Id. § 535(b)(2)(B), (3)(B).
[Vol. 3:2
CABLE TELEVISION MUST-CARRY RULES
than thirty-six usable activated channels must carry all local commercial
stations, up to one-third of their total channel capacity," and all qualified
local noncommercial educational stations.75 Only cable systems with 300 or
fewer subscribers are immune from the must-carry requirements.76
Furthermore, cable operators no longer may select the channel position-
ing of broadcast stations. Local commercial stations may choose to be car-
ried on (1) the channel on which they are broadcast over the air; (2) the
cable channel on which they were carried on July 19, 1985; or (3) the cable
channel on which they were carried on July 1, 1992." Noncommercial sta-
tions, however, are given only two channel positions from which to choose:
either (1) their over-the-air broadcast channel; or (2) the cable channel on
which they were carried on July 19, 1985. 78
Cable operators must carry the signals of must-carry stations in their
entirety.79 In addition, they are prohibited from deleting or repositioning a
broadcast station without giving the broadcaster at least thirty days written
notice."0 Furthermore, cable operators may neither demand nor accept pay-
ment for carriage of must-carry stations." Lastly, the FCC is charged with
resolving any disputes about carriage arising between broadcasters and cable
operators."
74 Id. § 534(b)(1)(B).
" Id. § 535(b)(1). Systems of this capacity, however, are not required to carry the
signal of a qualified local noncommercial educational station whose programming "sub-
stantially duplicates" that of another such station that requests carriage. Id. § 535(e).
The FCC has stated that "substantial duplication" exists if more than 50% of two
stations' weekly prime time programming is the same and more than 50% of non-prime
time programming is the same over a three month period, regardless of whether the
duplicated programming is broadcast on the same day or at the same time. on each
station. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.56(a) (1990).
76 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(A). Even one of these systems, however, becomes subject
to the must-carry requirements if it deletes a broadcast station's signal from its system.
Id.
77 Id. § 534(b)(6). The date July 19, 1985 is important because it was the date on
which Quincy was decided. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (striking down the FCC's must-carry rules), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986).
78 47 U.S.C. § 535(g)(5).
79 Id. §§ 534(b)(3), 535(g)(1).
80 Id. §§ 534(b)(9), (10)(B), 535(g)(3). Also, under no circumstance may a cable
operator delete or reposition a local commercial station during a "sweeps" period, de-
fined as "a period in which major television ratings services measure the size of audi-
ences of local television stations." Id. § 534(b)(9).
81 Id. §§ 534(b)(10), 535(i)(1). Noncommercial stations, however, can be required to
pay for any increased copyright costs resulting from the carriage of a signal "considered
[to be] a distant signal for copyright purposes." Id. § 535(i)(2).
82 Id. §§ 534(d), 5350).
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Although payment for carriage of must-carry stations is prohibited, sec-
tion 6 of the 1992 Cable Act provides for "retransmission consent."83 Cable
systems now are prohibited from carrying commercial broadcast stations
without their consent, unless such stations elect must-carry status.84 Sta-
tions must choose between reserving the right to retransmission consent or
asserting their must-carry rights every three years,85 and any station elect-
ing retransmission consent forfeits its right to must-carry during that three-
year period.86 Broadcasters, therefore, are given enormous power. Large,
popular stations are able to elect retransmission consent and demand pay-
ment from cable operators to retransmit their broadcasts, while less popular
stations still can be guaranteed carriage by electing must-carry status.87
B. Congressional Findings as a Basis for Must-Carry
Apparently learning its lesson after Quincy and Century Communica-
tions, Congress predicated the must-carry provisions in the 1992 Cable Act
on three years of extensive legislative hearings.88 As a result, rather than
relying on the FCC to enunciate the basis for the must-carry rules, Congress
made clear its purposes89 and included several findings of fact directly in
the text of the 1992 Cable Act.9"
83 See id. § 536.
8 Id. § 325(b)(1).
85 Id. § 325(b)(3)(B).
86 Id. § 325(b)(4).
87 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). As a result, retransmission consent has
exacerbated the effects of must-carry by devoting even more channels to the local
broadcasters. "Powerful broadcasters have leveraged their retransmission rights to de-
mand carriage of new broadcaster-affiliated cable program networks-now referred to
in the industry as 'ransom' channels-in exchange for retransmission of their signals."
Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 15 n.31, Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44).
88 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 39 (citing Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1991); Hearing before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
"Must-Carry": Hearing before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); 138 CONG.
REC. S400, S635 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Inouye) ("[T]he bill be-
fore us is the result of 13 days of hearings and 113 different witnesses. We have had
countless numbers of communications experts and lawyers look over the measure. We
have conferred with ... at least 500 knowledgeable citizens.")).
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV 1992).
90 See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2.
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Congress's purposes, as applicable to the must-carry rules, are to: (1)
"establish a national policy concerning cable communications;"9' (2) "en-
courage the growth and development of cable systems and ... assure that
cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local com-
munity; ' (3) "assure that cable communications provide and are encour-
aged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services to the public; '93 and (4) "promote competition in cable communi-
cations and minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue
economic burden on cable systems." 94 These purposes evince a desire to
foster the growth and development of the cable industry, while also ensuring
that local communities are protected and provided with diverse sources of
information. The must-carry rules, therefore, presumably are designed with
these goals in mind.
Congress inserted factual findings into the 1992 Cable Act, the vast
majority of which seem geared toward defending the must-carry provi-
sions.95 Of the twenty-one separate findings contained in section 2(a), nine-
teen relate directly to must-carry, and the other two relate indirectly.96
Many of the findings fall into several broad categories: 97 (1) the anti-com-
petitive dominance achieved by cable television; 98 (2) government interests
9, 47 U.S.C. § 521(1).
92 Id. § 521(2).
93 Id. § 521(4).
- Id. § 521(6).
9' See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a), (b).
96 Of the two findings that do not relate directly to must-carry, the first is a state-
ment detailing the large rise in monthly subscriber rates since the deregulation of cable
franchises in 1986, indicating that cable operators are doing very well financially. Id. §
2(a)(1). The second finding that is only indirectly related to must-carry laments the
regulatory-caused difficulties experienced by franchising authorities in denying franchise
renewals to cable operators which are not adequately serving their subscribers' needs,
implying that other means, such as must-carry, are needed to ensure that cable operators
meet the needs of local communities. Id. § 2(a)(20).
9' Some of the findings do not fit into these general categories. For the remainder of
the findings, see generally id. § 2(a).
9' Id. § 2(a)(2)-(5). Four subsections deal with cable's ascension to market domi-
nance and its potential for abuse. Congress stated:
(2) For a variety of reasons, including local franchising requirements and the
extraordinary expense of constructing more than one cable television system to
serve a particular geographic area, most cable television subscribers have no op-
portunity to select between competing cable systems. Without the presence of
another multichannel video programming distributor, a cable system faces no local
competition. The result is undue market power for the cable operator as compared
to that of consumers and video programmers.
(3) There has been a substantial increase in the penetration of cable television
systems over the past decade. Nearly 56,000,000 households, over 60 percent of
the households with televisions, subscribe to cable television, and this percentage
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in must-carry, including diversity,". access to noncommercial educational
television, 00 access to local commercial television,' and the continua-
tion of free and informative locally-originated television;0 2 and (3) cable's
threat to the economic viability of local broadcast television."3
is almost certain to increase. As a result of this growth, the cable television indus-
try has become a dominant nationwide video medium.
(4) The cable industry has become highly concentrated. The potential effects
of such concentration are barriers to entry for new programmers and a reduction
in the number of media voices available to consumers.
(5) The cable industry has become vertically integrated; cable operators and
cable programmers often have common ownership. As a result, cable operators
have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers. This could
make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage on
cable systems. Vertically integrated program suppliers also have the incentive and
ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over nonaffiliated cable operators
and programming distributors using other technologies.
Id.
Id. § 2(a)(6).
Id. § 2(a)(8). Congress claimed an interest in mandating carriage of public tele-
vision because it educates the nation's citizens and is responsive to the needs of local
communities which have contributed over $10,800,000,000 to it since 1972. Further-
more, the federal government has invested over $3,000,000,000 in public television
since 1969, and those who have supported it probably will be deprived of it without
must-carry. Id.
101 Id. § 2(a)(9). "The Federal Government has a substantial interest in having cable
systems carry the signals of local commercial television stations because the carriage of
such signals is necessary to serve the goals ... of providing a fair, efficient, and equi-
table distribution of broadcast services." Id.
'02 Id. § 2(a)(1 1). "Broadcast television stations continue to be an important source of
local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to
an informed electorate." Id. Congress also said that the local origination of broadcasting
was a primary objective of the system of television regulation, id. § 2(a)(10), and there
was a "substantial government interest" in ensuring that free television continues to be
available, particularly for those who cannot afford to pay to receive programming. Id. §
2(a)(12).
03 Id. § 2(a)(14)-(16). After reporting the large market share shift from broadcast
television to cable television, id. § 2(a)(13), Congress stated:
(14) Cable television systems and broadcast television stations increasingly
compete for television advertising revenues. As the proportion of households
subscribing to cable television increases, proportionately more advertising reve-
nues will be reallocated from broadcast to cable television systems.
(15) A cable television system which carries the signal of a local television
broadcaster is assisting the broadcaster to increase its viewership, and thereby
attract additional advertising revenues that otherwise might be earned by the cable
system operator. As a result, there is an economic incentive for cable systems to
terminate the retransmission of the broadcast signal, refuse to carry new signals,
or reposition a broadcast signal to a disadvantageous channel position. There is a
substantial likelihood that absent the reimposition of such a requirement, addition-
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Congress also included in the 1992 Cable Act a statement of policies
which gives insight into the role of the must-carry provisions. These policies
included: (1) promoting diverse views and information;"° (2) relying on
the marketplace, to the extent feasible;"°5 (3) ensuring the expansion of ca-
ble, where economically justified; °6 (4) protecting consumers from a lack
of competition in cable;'0 7 and (5) ensuring that cable does not achieve un-
due market power at the expense of consumers and broadcasters.'
C. Evidence Not Included in Congress's Findings
Despite Congress's predictions of doom for local broadcasters in the
absence of must-carry rules, actual data paint a different picture. Congress
asserted in the 1992 Cable Act that cable poses a threat to the economic
viability of local broadcasting,0 9 but local broadcasters seem to be thriving
since the fall of the previous must-carry provisions in Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC." Since the decision in Quincy in July of 1985, the number of
commercial broadcast stations actually has increased by more than twenty-
five percent."' Similarly, during the same period there was a twenty-one
percent growth in noncommercial stations,' and the number of low power
local stations increased during that period by 282%."' Furthermore, the
al local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried.
(16) As a result of the economic incentive that cable systems have to delete,
reposition, or not carry local broadcast signals, coupled with the absence of a
requirement that such systems carry local broadcast signals, the economic viability
of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local program-
ming will be seriously jeopardized.
Id.
4 Id. § 2(b)(1).
'0' Id. § 2(b)(2).
,01 Id. § 2(b)(3).
1o7 Id. § 2(b)(4).
108 Id. § 2(b)(5).
9 Id. § 2(a)(16).
", 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). For a dis-
cussion of the decision in Quincy, see supra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
i. Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 40 n.67, Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44) (citing FCC NEWS
RELEASE: BROADCAST STATION TOTALS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1992 (1993); FCC NEWS
RELEASE: BROADCAST STATION TOTALS FOR JULY 1985 (1985)).
112 Id.
1' Id. at 40 n.68 (citing FCC NEWS RELEASE: BROADCAST STATION TOTALS AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1992 (1993); FCC NEWS RELEASE: BROADCAST STATION TOTALS FOR
JULY 1985 (1985)). The must-carry rules mandate carriage of low power stations if
there is an insufficient number of full power local commercial stations to fulfill the
must-carry requirements. 47 U.S.C. § 534(c) (Supp. IV 1992). For a detailed definition
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average pre-tax profits of independent broadcast stations nearly doubled
during the year preceding the imposition of the 1992 Cable Act's must-carry
rules."4 Likewise, there was a thirty-six percent increase in the average
pre-tax profit of network affiliates during the same period,'15 and their
profits had increased an average of twenty-four percent during the entire
period since the demise of must-carry in 1985."16 In the absence of any
must-carry rules, therefore, local broadcasters have experienced both growth
and profitability.
Although Congress asserted that must-carry rules were needed, in part,
to promote diversity in programming," 7 the diversity of programming
choices actually has increased substantially since the previous must-carry
rules were invalidated in Quincy in 1985.'18 A 1991 Senate Report con-
cerning must-carry said that "programming choices have ... grown about
50 percent" since 1984." 9 In addition, cable programmers increased their
investment in new programming from $340 million in 1984 to $1.5 billion
in 1991.20 In fact, the FCC itself has acknowledged that cable program-
mers have contributed greatly to the diversity of programming choices avail-
able. 2'
In addition, although Congress was seeking to protect local broadcasting
from cable's suspected anti-competitive conduct and supposed incentive to
of "qualified low power station," see id. § 534(h)(2).
114 Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 40 n.68, Turner
(No. 93-44) (citing NATIONAL ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS, TELEVISION FINANCIAL RE-
PORT 64, 181 (1993)).
"' Id. at 40 n.69 (citing NATIONAL ASs'N OF BROADCASTERS, supra note 114, at 33,
150).
116 For a comparison of pre-tax profits of network affiliates during those years, see
the National Association of Broadcasting's Television Financial Report for each of the
years 1986-1993.
"' See 47 U.S.C. § 521(4); see also 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(b)(1).
s S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
119 Id.
120 H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1992). In particular, the news pro-
gramming budget of CNN and Headline News increased from $65 million in 1984 to an
estimated $181 million in 1993. See Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. et al. at 15 n.24, Turner (No. 93-44). In addition, the programming investment by
the Arts & Entertainment network increased 450% during that period; Lifetime's invest-
ment in programming had grown to 10 times what it was in 1984; and USA Network
increased its programming investment from $29 million in 1985 to $193 million in
1992. Id.
"2' See In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage
of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864, 880
(1986); Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licens-
ees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 196-221 (1985); see also In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5051-54 (1987).
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drop local broadcasters,"' it acknowledged that it "has not found that ca-
ble systems are engaging in a widespread pattern of denying carriage of
local television stations . 2..."3 In fact, of all cable systems included in a
1988 FCC staff report relied upon by Congress, eighty percent of such sys-
tems did not discontinue or deny carriage of any local stations, and another
ten percent only did so with one station." 4 Another report relied upon by
Congress detailed that of all local stations qualifying for mandatory carriage
under the rules struck down in Century Communications,15 a full ninety-
eight percent of them were being carried, and ninety-four percent of all
cable systems carried all local stations that would have qualified for manda-
tory carriage.2 6 The same report showed that many cable operators actual-
ly added broadcast stations to their systems after the previous must-carry
rules were struck down.'27 The supposed incentives to drop local broadcast
stations that Congress believed cable operators would have in the absence of
must-carry2 8 have existed since the demise of must-carry in 1985, but
Congress's supposition simply has failed to materialize.
IV. THE LOWER COURT DECISION IN TURNER
A. The Position of the Parties
The cable operators and programmers contended that the must-carry
provisions should be subjected to strict scrutiny and upheld "only if found
to [have been] precisely drawn to serve a compelling government interest,
and to [have gone] no further."' 129 Essentially, the programmers' claim was
that the must-carry rules favor the speech of local broadcasters over their
own speech. 30 This rendered the regulations, they believed, unconstitu-
122 See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(13)-(17).
113 H.R. REP. No. 628 at 52. "[M]ost cable systems have continued to carry a num-
ber of local over-the-air signals." Id. at 67.
124 POLICY AND RULES DIVISION, MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FCC, CABLE TELEVISION
BROADCAST SIGNAL CARRIAGE SURVEY REPORT, STAFF REPORT 13 (1988).
125 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
126 S. REP. NO. 92 at 43 (citing NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, BROADCAST
STATION CARRIAGE SURVEY 8 (1988)).
127 Id.
2' See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(15), (16).
129 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 39 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing
Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)), vacated and re-
manded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
131 Id. at 42.
1994] 729
730 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 3:2
tional on their face."' Even if O'Brien-level scrutiny' was used, how-
ever, they contended that the FCC could not show that the must-carry rules
served the government's asserted interest, even assuming it to be an impor-
tant one. 33 Furthermore, they argued that the provisions were not narrowly
tailored to accomplish the government's goal.'
The FCC responded by asserting that the must-carry rules should be
reviewed pursuant to O 'Brien as an incidental burden on speech, if a burden
at all.'35 Pursuant to this standard, the FCC argued, the rules should be up-
held if they are "shown to promote a significant government interest and not
to burden substantially more speech than necessary to vindicate that inter-
est." '36 The FCC argued that the must-carry rules survived this review
because they are essential to ensure that cable subscribers retain the ability
to view programming with a local "flavor" and to "preserve the vitality of a
free source of over-the-air programming to television viewers unwilling or
unable to obtain a cable connection."'
3 7
B. The Opinion of the Court
Writing for the court, Judge Jackson held that the must-carry rules in the
1992 Cable Act do not violate the First Amendment.'38 Early in the opin-
ion, Jackson stated: "the [c]ourt holds that the must-carry provisions are
essentially economic regulation designed to create competitive balance in the
video industry as a whole, and to redress the effects of the cable operators'
anti-competitive practices. ' By justifying the regulation as unrelated to
the content of speech, 4 ' Jackson was able to dismiss the plaintiffs' call for
strict scrutiny and employ the less rigorous test set forth in O'Brien and its
progeny. 4' Using that test, he then held that the must-carry rules are con-
stitutional.'42
In declaring the must-carry rules simply to be economic regulation,
Jackson stated that "[t]he commodity Congress undertook to regulate is the
means of delivery of video signals to individual receivers. It is not the infor-
mation the video signals may be used to impart. That the video signals
'3' Id. at 38.
132 See supra note 26.
133 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 46.
'34 Id. at 47.
'3 Id. at 39.
136 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
3 Id. at 38.
131 Id. at 36.
' Id. at 40.
140 Id.
'4' Id. at 41.
142 Id. at 47-48.
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could only be used to convey a message is of no particular signifi-
cance."'143 Strict scrutiny would apply, Jackson said, only if the must-carry
rules were content-based or if they presented an opportunity for government
censorship.'" Regulations compelling speech or restricting the discretion
to say what a speaker wants (the effect that the cable programmers and
operators claimed the must-carry rules had on them) are reviewed with strict
scrutiny only if "the government has prescribed the content-either the
message or the subject matter-of the speech to be spoken."' 145 Jackson
then stated that regulations favoring one group of speakers over another,
"speaker-partial" regulations, also are not subject to strict scrutiny review
unless they are content-based. 46 He then declared the must-carry rules to
be content-neutral because they were designed to "assure a functional mar-
ket in the distribution of video signals, whatever might be said with those
signals"'' 47 and because Congress's protection of local broadcasters "rests
on its assumption that [local broadcasters] have as much to say of interest or
141 Id. at 40.
'4 Id. at 42.
'41 Id. Judge Jackson distinguished the must-carry rules from the compelled speech
and editorial discretion cases cited by the cable programmers and operators. He said
that all of the other cited cases "involved regulation telling the speaker what to say or at
least what to talk about." Id. (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781
(1988) (involving statute that required charities to disclose the percentage of receipts
from fundraising actually going to charitable uses); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 10-11 & n.7 (1986) (plurality opinion) (involving statute that
required a utility to mail its rate-making opponents' fundraising appeals); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving statute that required motorist to display state
motto on license plate); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(involving statute that required newspaper to print replies of political candidates whom
it had opposed in editorials)).
146 Id. Judge Jackson again distinguished a case cited by the cable programmers and
operators, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating a statute limiting to $1,000
the amount that an individual could contribute to a particular political candidate). In
Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voices of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... " Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Jackson,
however, said that implicit in the Court's decision was a determination by Congress that
the speech of those spending over $1,000 was "louder" and somehow more sinister than
the speech of those spending less than $1,000. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 43 (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17). In Jackson's view, Buckley was a case in which the gov-
ernment attempted to suppress an idea, but strict scrutiny was not warranted because the
regulation was based upon speaker partiality, not upon what the speakers were saying.
Id.
14' Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 43. "A regulation is deemed to be content-neutral if it is
addressed to ends unrelated to the content of expression upon which it may have an
effect." Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989)).
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value as the cable programmers who service a given geographic market
audience, not on any recognition that there is a discrete 'local' subject-mat-
ter."'48 In other words, there is nothing special about the content of the
local signals that prompted Congress to mandate their carriage. Based on
this content-neutrality, Jackson reviewed the must-carry rules pursuant to
O'Brien and Ward.'49
After determining the level of scrutiny to utilize, Jackson proceeded to
apply the test. The must-carry rules would survive if the government could
show that they furthered a significant government interest and that they were
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 5° The government's asserted inter-
est was "to promote fair competition among video 'speakers' in order to
assure the survival of local broadcasting for the benefit of both those who
subscribe to a cable service and for those who do not."'' Although the
courts in Quincy and Century Communications declined to rule on the sig-
nificance of this interest, Jackson found that the importance of local broad-
casting to the public clearly had been established by other cases.' Even
assuming the importance of this interest, however, the cable programmers
and operators cited evidence that the must-carry rules did not further that
interest because the factual basis of the rules-that the local broadcasting
industry is in danger-was incorrect.' Nevertheless, Jackson found the
record compiled by Congress sufficient to demonstrate that cable operators
routinely denied carriage to local broadcasters, attached conditions to their
148 Id. at 44.
'4 Id. at 45. Once again, Judge Jackson found it necessary to distinguish a case, this
time Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a law
requiring a newspaper to print replies of political candidates whom it had opposed in
editorials). Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 45 n.25. In Tornillo, the Court rejected the
government's assertion that economic barriers to newspaper access justified the com-
pelled speech. See id. The regulation in Tornillo, however, was content-based because it
"exacted its penalty on the basis of the antecedent publication of one message and it
compelled carriage of another." Id. (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58). The must-
carry rules were different, Jackson reasoned, because their goal is to provide the public
with "access to diverse kinds of communications in order to overcome technological,
structural, and historic, as well as economic factors." Id. Basing his decision to use
relaxed scrutiny on these "contextual factors unique to cable" even though the must-
carry provisions may be "marginally content-related," Jackson acknowledged that his
conclusion depended in part upon Congress's factual findings. Id.
o See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
"' Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 45.
52 Id. at 45-46 (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-
73 & nn.38 & 39 (1968); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984);
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
'.. Id. at 46. For a discussion of the evidence cited by the cable programmers and
operators, see supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
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carriage, and repositioned them to remote channels. 4 Based on the con-
gressional record, Jackson stated:
[E]ven if the state of the broadcasting industry is not now as
parlous as the [government] contend[s], ... cable operators
have attained a position of dominance in the video signal
distribution market, and can henceforth exercise the attendant
market power.... [T]his market power provides cable oper-
ators with both incentive and present ability to block non-
cable programmers' access to the bulk of any prospective
viewing audience; unconstrained, cable holds the future of
local broadcasting at its mercy."5
As a result of this prospect of abuse of market power, Jackson held that the
must-carry rules furthered a substantial government interest. 56
Jackson next held that "the must-carry provisions are sufficiently, if not
surgically, tailored to Congress's larger economic market-adjusting objec-
tive."' 57 Although Jackson admitted that Congress could have protected
local broadcasting with means less restrictive than the must-carry provisions,
he stated that "under O'Brien, the government is not required to settle for
means that serve its interests less effectively merely because an alternative
might be less burdensome."'58 He then refused to question Congress's con-
clusion that the must-carry rules were necessary to protect local broadcast-
ing.' In effect, Jackson simply deferred to the congressional belief that
these particular must-carry rules were needed. He concluded that the provi-
sions did not "unnecessarily burden a substantial amount" of the speech of
cable operators because they retain discretion over the majority of their
available channels, they must devote no more than one-third of their chan-
nels to local commercial broadcast stations, they do not have to carry more
than three local noncommercial educational stations, and they need not carry
duplicative programming.16 ° Thus, because the must-carry provisions leave
plentiful alternative channels available to the cable programmers and opera-
tors, they are narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest. 6' As a
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1991)).
155 Id.
156 Id.
117 Id. at 47.
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result, Jackson concluded that the must-carry rules do not violate the First
Amendment. 162
C. Judge Sporkin's Concurrence
Judge Sporkin wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that he did not
believe that the case implicated the First Amendment to the extent claimed
by the cable programmers and operators. 6 3 He stated that "this case is not
about protecting free speech and the First Amendment. This case is about
market domination and control."'" To the extent that the First Amendment
was implicated at all, Sporkin agreed with Jackson that the relaxed scrutiny
of O'Brien and Ward should apply.1
65
To demonstrate that the must-carry rules are content-neutral, Sporkin
likened this case to Regan v. Taxation with Representation.66 Regan held
constitutional section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which bases
tax-exempt status on the purposes for which organizations operate. 67 Al-
though section 501(c)(3) distinguishes between different groups, "[f]inding
'no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas,' the Court
found that section 501(c)(3) is not a content-based restriction on
speech.' ' 6' As a result of Congress's economic, rather than content-based,
motive in enacting the must-carry provisions, Sporkin did not question
Congress's method of furthering its interest. 69
D. Judges Williams' Dissent
Circuit Judge Williams filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued
that the must-carry rules are content-based and thus should be reviewed
using strict scrutiny. 7 He believed that the interests advanced by the gov-
ernment in support of the provisions were insufficient to justify them. 7'
As a result, Williams would have declared the must-carry provisions uncon-
stitutional. '
162 Id. at 47-48.
163 Id. at 51 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
" Id. at 52 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 54 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
1- 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
167 Id. at 550.
168 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 55 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 57 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
170 Id. at 59-60 (Williams, J., dissenting).
'T' Id. at 60-65 (Williams, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 65, 67 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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Williams first examined the standard of review to be applied to the
must-carry rules and concluded that precedent mandated the use of strict
scrutiny.7 3 In his view, the way in which local broadcasting is defined
automatically renders the must-carry provisions content-based.'74 Congress
explicitly rested its decision to benefit the stations upon the stations' pro-
gramming content, finding that they are "an important source of local news
and public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to
an informed electorate."'' More importantly to Williams, however, the
FCC licensing requirements that allowed the local stations to broadcast le-
gally bound them to "provide programming responsive to issues of concern
to its community."'7 They would not be local broadcasters, therefore, if
not for the content of their programming.
Williams believed that the case was controlled by Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind.' 7 The statute at issue in Riley was deemed con-
tent-based because "[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise
make necessarily alters the content of the speech."'17 In the case of must-
carry, cable operators were being forced to replace their chosen program-
ming with programs chosen by local broadcasters.7 7 Examining more
closely the possibility that the rules were merely incidental burdens on
speech, Williams concluded that "[g]iven the finite number of cable chan-
nels, replacement of the cablecaster's choice of programs with those of local
broadcasters suppresses the alternative programs as completely as if Con-
gress had ordered them shut down; there is nothing 'incidental' about the
burden."'' ° To seal the issue, Williams noted that strict scrutiny applies to
the control of editorial discretion, which surely, in his view, comprises
choice of programming."'
171 Id. at 60 (Williams, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 58 (Williams, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(1 1)).
176 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Revision of Programming and Commer-
cialization Policies, Ascertaining Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for
Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1091-92 (1984) (report and order)
[hereinafter Commercial TV Stations]).
M 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (involving a statute that required charities to disclose the
percentage of receipts actually going to charitable uses).
178 Id. at 795.
179 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 59 (Williams, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). Williams noted that cable systems serving one-third
of all subscribers do not have any excess channel capacity, and many cable program-
mers would be dropped from cable systems to make room for local broadcasters receiv-
ing preferential treatment. Id. at 59 n.3 (Williams, J., dissenting).
... Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444
(1991) ("[Cable] is engaged in 'speech' under the first amendment, and is, in much of
its operation, part of the 'press."'); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (noting that cable operators exercise significant editorial
1994] 735
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
After determining that strict scrutiny was the correct standard of review,
Williams applied the test. He said that a regulation of speech could survive.
strict scrutiny if it "serve[s] a 'compelling' governmental purpose and its
'means [are] carefully tailored to achieve those ends."" 82 He consolidated
the government's asserted interests into two categories, diversity and the
preservation of local broadcasters,' 3 and addressed each in turn.
Williams assumed that the promotion of diversity in broadcasting was a
compelling government objective, but he concluded that the fit between that
interest and the must-carry regulations was too weak. 4 One reason that he
found the fit to be too weak was the availability of alternatives. 5 Wil-
liams saw a less restrictive alternative to be the "leased access" provisions,
which apply only to use by "persons unaffiliated with the [cable] opera-
tor."'8 6 In Williams' view, this was less burdensome than the must-carry
provisions because the leased-access provisions include all programmers
who may need access to cable, "except the ones that don't need it-the af-
filiates of a cable operator." '8 The leased access provisions designate a
certain portion of a cable operator's channel capacity for use by those unaf-
filiated with the operator,' 8 and they give the FCC the authority to deter-
mine reasonable rates and conditions for such use.8 9 A House Report stat-
ed that a legislative committee holding hearings about the 1992 Cable Act
"belie[ved] that access requirements establish a form of content-neutral
structural regulation which will foster the availability of a diversity of view-
points to the listening audience."' 9 ° Given this less restrictive alternative
method to achieve Congress's diversity goal, Williams reasoned that the
discretion)). Williams then distinguished Leathers, which held that the First Amendment
is not implicated by differential taxation of speakers unless it is aimed at particular
ideas or presents the danger of suppressing them. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450. He said
that Leathers involved a "broad-based, content-neutral sales tax," the analysis of which
"cannot be transported to the context of a burden imposed on one set of speakers for
the direct and explicit advantage of a limited class of competitors-a class whose pro-
gramming must, as a matter of law, include content of a type specified by the govern-
ment." Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 60 (Williams, J., dissenting).
82 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 60 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Sable Communi-
cations v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
183 Id. at 60-61 (Williams, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 61 (Williams, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993) ("[I]f there are numerous and obvious less-burden-
some alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable.")).
186 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1988).
Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 61 (Williams, J., dissenting).
88 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1).
89 Id. § 532(c)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. IV 1992).
190 H.R. REP. NO. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1992).
[Vol. 3:2
CABLE TELEVISION MUST-CARRY RULES
must-carry provisions do not provide a reasonable fit to achieve this
goal.' 91
Turning next to the government's asserted interest in preserving local
broadcasting, Williams found that the portion of this interest associated with
the content of local broadcasting is plainly impermissible to justify the must-
carry rules." 2 As for the preservation of over-the-air television, Williams
saw no evidence that access to it was in jeopardy." 3 He noted that since
the fall of must-carry in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,94 the abstract risk
of the demise of over-the-air television simply had failed to materialize;
instead the number of commercial broadcast stations increased by twenty-
two percent, the number of educational stations increased by fifteen percent,
and the number of cities receiving broadcast television increased by sixteen
percent.195 In addition, despite the "marked shift in market share from
broadcast television to cable television"'96 and the structural relationships
giving cable operators an incentive to drop local broadcasters from their
channel lineups,'97 both of which were specifically found by Congress,
Williams said that the evidence led to a different conclusion." 8 Evidence
presented to Congress showed: (1) eighty percent of all cable operators had
never dropped a local broadcaster; 99 (2) approximately 3600 instances in
which cable operators had dropped local stations, although this figure was
taken from a total of over 64,000 local stations being carried on cable sys-
tems;200 and (3) ninety-eight percent of all local broadcast stations that
would have qualified pursuant to the invalidated must-carry rules were still
being carried even without any must-carry requirement in effect.2'
'~' Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 62 (Williams, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). Assuming arguendo that an interest in local content
somehow could be compelling, Williams said that a simple subsidy provided to local
broadcasters would be a less restrictive means of achieving that goal. Id. (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991)). With this alternative
available, "Congress cannot advance specific content by requiring a competing class of
first amendment speakers to carry the favored speech." Id. (Williams, J., dissenting)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
'13 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
' 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). For a discus-
sion of Quincy, see supra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
9 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 63 (Williams, J., dissenting).
196 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(13).
' Id. § 2(a)(12), (14)-(15).
118 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 63-65 (Williams, J., dissenting).
'99 Id. at 63 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
43 (1991)).
100 Id. at 63-64 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 43 (1991)).
201 Id. at 64 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Plaintiff Klein's Affidavit 12, Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (No. 93-44)).
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Furthermore, Williams asserted that the supposed incentive for cable
operators to drop local broadcasters is unsound." 2 He stated that cable
television remains dependent on the supply of programming contributed by
local broadcasters, which accounts for over two-thirds of the total viewing
hours on cable systems." 3 Furthermore, the competition for advertising
revenue is not nearly as dangerous to local broadcasters as Congress pre-
sumed because cable operators receive twenty-five times as much revenue
from subscription fees as they do from advertising revenue.2" As long as
local broadcasting remains as popular as it is, Williams said that cable oper-
ators cannot afford to drop local broadcasters to the point of endangering
the local broadcasters' economic viability." 5
In general, therefore, Williams believed that the must-carry provisions in
the 1992 Cable Act suffered from deficiencies similar to the ones in prior
attempts at must-carry. He simply was not satisfied that there was an ade-
quate factual basis justifying the must-carry restrictions on speech. Although
Congress inserted several findings into the text of the Act, Williams found
that the findings did not "support the inferences needed to sustain must-
carry."20 6 As a result of these failures, Judge Williams determined that the
must-carry rules violate the First Amendment.
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN TURNER
A. Opinion of the Court
A divided Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings.0 7 The Court held that the must-carry provi-
sions are content-neutral and, therefore, are subject to intermediate scrutiny
pursuant to the test set forth in the United States v. O'Brien.8 and Ward v.
Rock Against Racism °9 decisions.210 In applying the test to the must-
carry provisions, however, the Court was unable to determine whether the
202 Id. at 64-65 (Williams, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 35)
(1991)).
204 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). Williams also noted that less intrusive means are
available to safeguard the survival of local broadcasters. As with the goal of promoting
diversity, if evidence of a risk to the existence of local broadcasting appeared, Congress
could provide subsidies or expand the leased access provision of § 612 of the 1984
Cable Act. Id. at 64-65 (Williams, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 65 (Williams, J., dissenting).
207 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2472 (1994).
208 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
209 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
210 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458-69.
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provisions meet the test's requirements."' As a result, the Court remanded
the case for further factual development as to whether the must-carry provi-
sions actually further the government's asserted interests and how they
actually affect the speech of cable operators and programmers.212
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began by addressing the appro-
priate standard of review applicable to the regulation of cable television.2"3
The Court rejected the government's assertion that regulation of cable televi-
sion should receive the same scrutiny as does regulation of broadcast televi-
sion.2"4 The Court agreed with the lower court's declaration that the re-
laxed scrutiny applicable to regulation of broadcast television is justified by
the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum,"5 a limitation which
does not hamper cable television.2"6 In doing so, the Court made clear that
its decisions regarding regulation of broadcast television are based upon the
physical limitations of the technology, rather than any dysfunction in the
market.2t7 Because cable television does not share these physical character-
istics, the Court ruled that regulations burdening cable operators or program-
mers must be subjected to some degree of heightened scrutiny."' The par-
ticular level of review would be selected based upon whether the must-carry
provisions are content-neutral or content-based.219
Five justices agreed that the must-carry rules, insofar as they apply to
full power broadcasters, are content-neutral.220 The Court found that the
2 Id. at 2469-72.
212 Id.
213 The District of Columbia Circuit expressly declined to rule on the appropriate
level of review in both previous must-carry cases. See Century Communications Corp.
v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986).
214 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
215 For a discussion of the "scarcity rationale," see supra notes 28-33 and accom-
panying text.
216 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
217 Id.
2' Id. at 2458.
219 Id. at 2458-59.
220 Id. at 2458-64. The Court explicitly refused to rule on the must-carry provisions
that mandate carriage of low power broadcast stations and directed the lower court to
consider the matter on remand. Id. at 2460 n.6 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(c) (Supp. IV
1992)). In doing so, however, the Court intimated that it considered the rules regarding
low power stations to be content-based, stating:
[A] low power station may become eligible for carriage only if, among other
things, the FCC determines that the station's programming "would address local
news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full pow-
er television broadcast stations because of the geographic distance of such full
power stations from the low power station's community of license." ... We rec-
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must-carry provisions are not content-based on their face because
"[a]lthough the provisions interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion
by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain minimum number of
broadcast stations, the extent of the interference does not depend upon the
content of the cable operators' programming." '221 Similarly, the burden
placed upon cable programmers by reducing the number of available
channels on which they may be carried is unrelated to content because "it
extends to all cable programmers irrespective of the programming they
choose to offer viewers." 2 Finally, the Court found that the privileges
conferred by the must-carry provisions also are content-neutral because they
apply to all full power broadcasters, "be they commercial or noncommercial,
independent or network-affiliated, English or Spanish language, religious or
secular." '223 The effect of the rules as a whole, therefore, is "to make every
full power commercial and noncommercial broadcaster eligible for must-
carry, provided only that the broadcaster operates within the same television
market as a cable system. "224
The Court next examined whether, despite their facial neutrality, the
must-carry rules are content-based because their "manifest purpose is to
ognize that this aspect of § 4 appears to single out certain low power broadcasters
for special benefits on the basis of content.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 534 (h)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992)). Likewise, the Court noted that
in determining whether to grant must-carry privileges to otherwise geographically ineli-
gible broadcasters, the FCC must consider "the value of localism" and whether the
broadcast station "provides news coverage of issues of concern to such community...
or coverage of sporting and other events of interest to the community." Id. (citing 47
U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C)(ii)). The Court directed the lower court also to address this provi-
sion on remand. Id.
2 Id. at 2460. In this regard, the Court distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). In Tornillo, the Court found that newspapers
could avoid the law's access requirements by altering the content of its speech-"by
refraining from speech critical of political candidates." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460. In
this case, however, the Court declared that cable operators are unable to avoid the man-
datory carriage requirements by altering their programming. Id.
222 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460 (distinguishing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319
(1988) (plurality opinion) (involving ban on picketing in front of foreign embassy with
signs critical of that embassy's government)).
223 Id.
224 Id. Based on this finding, the Court essentially agreed with the lower court that
although
the must-carry provisions distinguish between speakers in the television program-
ming market ... they do so based only upon the manner in which speakers trans-
mit their messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry . . . . So
long as they are not a subtle means of exercising a content preference, speaker
distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid under the First Amendment.
Id. at 2460-61. For a discussion of the Court's rejection of a strict scrutiny standard of
review based on speaker preference, see infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
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regulate speech because of the message it conveys." '225 The Court rejected
the assertion that the purpose of the must-carry provisions is to favor partic-
ular speech based upon its content.226 Instead, the Court found that
Congress's manifest purpose is to "preserve access to free television pro-
gramming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable." '227 Recounting
what it called "unusually detailed statutory findings," the Court then set
forth the statutory provisions supporting its finding of such an overriding
purpose.228 The Court then stated that this purpose is unrelated to the con-
tent of speech affected by the regulations.229
In a key portion of its opinion, the majority attempted to rebut argu-
ments used by the dissent and by Judge Williams below supporting their be-
liefs that the must-carry provisions are content-based.23 ° First, the Court
declared that Congress's references to the value of local broadcasting in the
1992 Cable Act23 do not render the must-carry provisions content-based
because such references "do[] not indicate that Congress regarded broadcast
programming as more valuable than cable programming. Rather, it reflects
nothing more than the recognition that the services provided by broadcast
22 Id. at 2461 (citing United States v. Eichman, 469 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) ("Al-
though the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the
scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted
interest is related to the suppression of free expression.").
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. For a discussion of Congress's statutory findings related to the protection of
free broadcast television, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
229 Id. at 2461 (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)
("[P]rotecting noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service
due to competition from cable systems ... [is an] important and substantial federal
interest.")).
230 Id. at 2461-64. Before responding to any particular argument, the Court charac-
terized the general design of the must-carry rules, stating:
The rules ... confer must-carry rights on all full power broadcasters, irrespective
of the content of their programming. They do not require or prohibit the carriage
of particular ideas or points of view. They do not penalize cable operators or
programmers because of the content of their programming. They do not compel
cable operators to affirm points of view with which they disagree. They do not
produce any net decrease in the amount of available speech. And they leave cable
operators free to carry whatever programming they wish on all channels not sub-
ject to must-carry requirements.
Id. at 2461-62.
231 See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(1 1) (noting that broadcast television is
"an important source of local news[,] public affairs programming[,] and other local
broadcast services critical to an informed electorate"); id. § 2(a)(10) (noting that the
local origination of broadcasting is a primary objective of the system of television regu-
lation); id. § 2(a)(8) (noting that noncommercial television "provides educational and
informational programming to the Nation's citizens").
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television have some intrinsic value and, thus, are worth preserving against
the threats posed by cable." '232 In response to the contention that the must-
carry rules are content-based because preferring broadcast television stations
"automatically entails content requirements"23 3 due to what the majority
called "limited content restraints imposed by statute and FCC regula-
tion, 234 the Court declared that the FCC's oversight responsibilities are
too limited to affect the content of broadcast programming.235 Importantly
for the Court, those responsibilities "do not grant [the FCC] the power to
ordain any particular type of programming that must be offered by broadcast
stations. 2 36 Based upon the government's minimal influence over pro-
gramming content, "it would be difficult to conclude that Congress enacted
must-carry in an effort to exercise content control over what subscribers
view on cable television. "237 The Court considered suggestions of a con-
tent-based purpose to be little more than speculation, noting that "it is a
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive. 238
- The Court also rejected three additional arguments that the Appellants
believed warranted strict scrutiny review of the must-carry rules. First, rely-
ing on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo239 and Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,24 the Appellants
232 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462.
233 Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C.
1993) (Williams, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)).
234 Id. at 2462-63 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303b (Supp. IV 1992) (directing FCC to con-
sider extent to which license renewal applicant has "served the educational and informa-
tional needs of children"); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988) (allowing FCC to revoke
broadcast license for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to broadcast
airtime for candidates seeking federal elective office); Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a),
106 Stat. 954 (restricting indecent programming); En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44
F.C.C.2d 2303, 2312 (1960) (requiring broadcasters to air programming that serves "the
public interest, convenience or necessity"); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1993) (requiring
broadcasters to notify victims of on-air personal attacks and to provide victims with op-
portunity to respond over the air)).
235 Id. at 2462-63.
236 Id. at 2463 (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of
Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960) and citing Commercial TV Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d
1076, 1091-92 (1984), modified, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
237 Id. at 2464.
238 Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
239 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring newspapers to print the
reply, free of charge, of any political candidate of whom the newspaper was critical).
240 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a rule requiring a utility com-
pany to include in its bills a newsletter from a consumer group critical of the utility
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asserted that the must-carry rules compel speech by cable operators.24 The
Court disagreed, distinguishing Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric on three
bases. 42 First, the must-carry rules apply in a content-neutral manner,
whereas the statutes at issue in the other two cases conferred benefits based
upon speaker viewpoint.243 Second, little risk exists that viewers will asso-
ciate the ideas expressed on broadcast stations with the cable operators who
are required to carry those stations, thereby obviating the need for cable
operators to alter their own messages to respond to messages conveyed on
broadcast stations.2" Finally, the Court noted the technological differences
between cable television and newspapers, which were the subject of the
regulation at issue in Tornillo."5 Although newspapers, even those enjoy-
ing a natural local monopoly, cannot obstruct access to competing publica-
tions, "the physical connection between the television set and the cable
network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over
most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the
subscriber's home."2" As a result, the Court declined to apply Tornillo's
strict scrutiny review.
Refusing to accept the Appellants' second contention that strict scrutiny
was mandated by the speaker preference favoring broadcasters over cable
programmers,247  the Court distinguished Buckley v. Valeo.248
"Buckley... stands for the proposition that laws favoring some speakers
over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference
reflects a content preference." '249 Referring back to its preceding determina-
company's ratemaking practices).
241 See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
242 Id. at 2464-66.
243 Id. at 2465.
244 Id. at 2465-66 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980)
(noting that the views expressed by speakers who are granted a right of access to a
shopping center would "not likely be identified with those of the owner")).
245 Id. at 2466.
24 Id. "A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the voice
of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch." Id. In drawing this technologi-
cal distinction between cable television and newspapers, and the technological distinc-
tion between cable television and broadcast television, the Court implicitly recognized
that regulations affecting cable television should be reviewed pursuant to a distinct stan-
dard, rather than one simply borrowed from another medium. See id. at 2456-58.
247 Id. at 2466-67.
248 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal law limiting individual spending to $1,000
per year to support or oppose a political candidate).
249 Id. at 2467. The Court stated that Buckley "stands for the proposition that speaker-
based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government's preference for
the substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what disfavored
speakers have to say)." Id. To support this proposition, the Court cited Regan v. Taxa-
tion with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983), which let stand tax laws that treat-
1994]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
tion that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral, the Court found that
Buckley did not command strict scrutiny in this case.25
The last challenge made by the Appellants and rejected by the Court
alleged that strict scrutiny was required because the must-carry provisions
single out cable operators for disfavored treatment."' Differential treat-
ment laws, however, are "constitutionally suspect only in certain circum-
stances." ' The Court explained that although strict scrutiny would apply
to differential treatment laws structured in a way that suppressed certain
ideas, strict scrutiny is inappropriate "when the differential treatment is
'justified by some special characteristic of' the particular medium being
regulated."5 As the Court previously stated, the must-carry provisions are
justified by "the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators
and the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast televi-
sion." '254 Moreover, unlike the tax provisions in Minneapolis Star & Tri-
bune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue255 and Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland,256 the must-carry provisions apply broadly to al-
most all cable systems, eliminating the dangers of suppression and manipu-
lation posed by narrowly targeted laws.257
After finding the must-carry provisions to be content-neutral and reject-
ing the application of strict scrutiny review, the Court selected intermediate
ed veterans groups differently from other charitable organizations. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at
2467. The Court noted, however, that Regan 'would have been decided differently if
there had been any "indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or
any demonstration that it has had that effect." Id. (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
250 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2467.
25! Id. at 2467-69. To support this argument, the Appellants relied on cases involving
discriminatory taxation of the press. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (invalidating a sales tax imposed upon general interest
magazines other than exempted religious, professional, trade, and sports magazines,
because it operated against a limited number of magazines and was based upon subject
matter); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (invalidating a use tax levied upon paper and ink used to produce newspa-
pers because it applied only to the press and affected only a small number of newspa-
pers); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (invalidating a tax imposed
upon publications whose weekly circulations exceeded 20,000 where such tax applied to
only 13 of 135 newspapers distributed in the state).
252 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444
(1991) (upholding application of general tax to cable television despite exemption for
print media and scrambled satellite broadcast television)).
253 Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
254 Id.
255 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
256 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
257 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (ex-
empting only systems with less than 300 subscribers)).
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scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review."' Pursuant to the O'Brien
test, which applies to laws subjected to intermediate scrutiny, the Court will
uphold a content-neutral law if "it furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernment interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est."259 As an initial matter, the Court identified three interrelated interests
asserted by Congress to justify the must-carry provisions: "(1) preserving
the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and
(3) promoting fair competition in the market for television program-
ming. '" 60 The Court had no trouble finding these interests to be important
and unrelated to content. 6'
The Court had considerable trouble, however, in deciding whether the
must-carry provisions actually advance Congress's asserted interests.262 In
this regard, the Court declared that the government must show that "the
economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of
the protections afforded by must-carry... [and] that the remedy it has
adopted does not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests.' 263 Given the state of the
record developed below, the Court was unable to decide whether the gov-
ernment had met either burden.2"
The Court first noted that "[w]hen the Government defends a regulation
on speech as a means to... prevent anticipated harms, it must... demon-
strate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way. '265 Conversely, the Court also recognized that the predictive judg-
25 Id. at 2469 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
259 Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). To satisfy the narrow tailoring component,
the regulation at issue need not be the least restrictive means of promoting the govern-
mental interests; rather, it is sufficient if the "means chosen do not 'burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."' Id.
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
260 Id. (citing 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(8), (9), (10); H.R. REP. No. 628,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1992); S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991)).
261 See id.
262 Id. at 2470-72.
263 Id. at 2470 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
264 Id.
263 Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); Los Angeles v. Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) ("This Court may not simply
assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to
justify its abridgement of expressive activity."); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (striking down previous version of must-carry rules);
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ments of Congress deserve substantial deference,'" although a judicial in-
quiry still is necessary to determine whether "Congress has drawn reason-
able inferences based on substantial evidence.""2 7 Given this framework
for examination, the Court stated that the government's contention that the
must-carry provisions are needed to protect the economic viability of broad-
cast television is based upon two propositions: "(1) that unless cable opera-
tors are compelled to carry broadcast stations, significant numbers of broad-
cast stations will be refused carriage on cable systems; and (2) that the
broadcast stations denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial
degree or fail altogether. 268
Examining the record with which it was presented, the Court essentially
found two groups of deficiencies preventing it from deciding the constitu-
tional validity of the must-carry provisions.269 First, the record was insuffi-
cient to determine whether broadcast television was in jeopardy.27° The
Court recognized that conflicting conclusions could be drawn from statistics
presented to show that cable systems dropped or repositioned broadcast
stations.27' The Court also saw no evidence that broadcasters dropped from
cable systems would suffer financially as a result of being dropped. 72 Sec-
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A] regulation per-
fectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly capri-
cious if that problem does not exist.")).
2 Id. at 2471 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973) (stating that the "judgment of the Legislative Branch" should
not be ignored "simply because [appellants] cas[t] [their] claims under the umbrella of
the First Amendment")).
267 Id. (citing Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (striking down second attempt at must-carry rules)).
268 Id.
269 Id. at 2471-72.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 2471. The Government presented a 1988 FCC study showing that approx-
imately 20 percent of cable systems dropped or refused carriage to at least one local
broadcast station, and 23 percent of cable systems moved the channel position of at
least one local broadcast station. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 42-
43) (1991)). "The record does not indicate, however, the time frame within which these
drops occurred, or how many of these stations were dropped for only a temporary peri-
od and then restored to carriage." Id.
27 Id. at 2472. The Court asked for "elaboration in the District Court of the predic-
tive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the introduction of some
additional evidence to establish that the dropped or repositioned broadcasters would be
at serious risk of financial difficulty . . . ." Id. The Court then gave some insight into
what kind of evidence would be sufficient:
We think it significant, for instance, that the parties have not presented any evi-
dence that local broadcast stations have fallen into bankruptcy, turned in their
broadcast licenses, curtailed their broadcast operations, or suffered a serious re-
duction in operating revenues as a result of being dropped from, or otherwise
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ond, the Court believed that the record did not disclose "the actual effects of
must-carry on the speech of cable operators and cable programmers...
",273 In the absence of such evidence, the Court was unable to assess accu-
rately the narrow tailoring component of the O'Brien test.y14 As a result of
these deficiencies, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the
case for the development of the factual record and the resolution of any
outstanding factual disputes."5
B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
believed that the must-carry provisions are content-based and invalid pur-
suant to strict scrutiny review." 6 Furthermore, Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Ginsburg agreed that even if the must-carry provisions are content-neu-
tral, they violate the First Amendment when analyzed pursuant to intermedi-
ate scrutiny. 77 Accordingly, four Justices would have reversed the decision
of the lower court.278
Although the four dissenting Justices concurred in the portion of Justice
Kennedy's opinion demanding some measure of heightened scrutiny and
setting forth the general framework for distinguishing between content-based
and content-neutral laws,279 their agreement ended there. The dissenters
concluded that the content-based character of the must-carry provisions is
apparent on the face of the statute.8 Although agreeing with the majority
that content-neutral speaker preferences are not subject to strict scrutiny, the
dissenters thought that Congress's findings included in the 1992 Cable
disadvantaged by, cable systems.
Id.
273 Id. Specifically, the Court wanted evidence in the record indicating
the extent to which cable operators will, in fact, be forced to make changes in
their current or anticipated programming selections; the degree to which cable
programmers will be dropped from cable systems to make room for local
broadcasters; and the extent to which cable operators can satisfy their must-carry





276 Id. at 2475-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277 Id. at 2479-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas chose not to join this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
278 Id. at 2480-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279 For a discussion of this section of the opinion, see supra notes 213-219 and ac-
companying text.
280 Id. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Ace 8 made clear that the preference for broadcasters over cable program-
mers was content-based.282 The must-carry provisions themselves also pro-
vided evidence to the dissenters of a content-based justification."3 In re-
sponding to the Court's refusal to address the provisions that affect low
power stations and those that grant must-carry privileges to otherwise geo-
graphically ineligible broadcast stations,284 the four dissenting Justices stat-
ed that "[t]hese provisions may all be technically severable from the statute,
but they are still strong evidence of the statute's justifications.""2 5 These
portions of the statutes demonstrated to the dissenters that the preferences
for broadcasters over cable programmers, although perhaps not reflective of
viewpoint discrimination, are justified only by reference to content.286
281 See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2.
2 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(6) ("There is a substantial govern-
mental and First Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided
through multiple technology media."); id. § 2(a)(8)(A) ("[P]ublic television provides
educational and informational programming to the Nation's citizens, thereby advancing
the government's compelling interest in educating its citizens); id. § 2(a)(10) ("A prima-
ry objective and benefit of our Nation's system of regulation of television broadcasting
is the local origination of programming. There is a substantial governmental interest in
ensuring its continuation"); id. § 2(a)(1 1) ("Broadcast television stations continue to be
an important source of local news and public affairs programming and other local
broadcast services critical to an informed electorate.")).
283 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 47 U.S.C. §
534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1992) (directing the FCC, in determining a broadcast
station's eligibility for must-carry, to "afford particular attention to the value of local-
ism" by considering "whether any other [eligible station] provides news coverage of
issues of concern to such community or provides carriage of sporting and other events
of interest in the community"); id. § 534(h)(2)(B) (directing the FCC, in determining
the must-carry eligibility of a low power station, to consider whether the station "would
address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by
full power television broadcast stations")). Justice O'Connor also noted the distinction
drawn between commercial television stations and noncommercial educational television
stations. Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284 See id. at 2460 n.6.
285 Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor
stated:
Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational program-
ming, and for news and public affairs all make reference to content. They may
not reflect hostility to particular points of view, or a desire to suppress certain
subjects because they are controversial or offensive. They may be quite benignly
motivated. But benign motivation, we have consistently held, is not enough to
avoid the need for strict scrutiny of content-based justifications.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991); Arkan-
sas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987)).
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Moreover, the dissent argued that the Court's conclusion that Congress's
interest in diversity is content-neutral was wrong because "[t]he interest in
ensuring access to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources of in-
formation, no matter how praiseworthy, is directly tied to the content of
what the speakers will likely say. "287
The dissenting Justices also were unpersuaded that an additional, per-
missible justification by Congress could rescue the content-based must-carry
provisions from strict scrutiny review.288 They took issue with the Court's
characterization of Congress's findings as "nothing more than the recogni-
tion that the services provided by broadcast television have some intrinsic
value and, thus, are worth preserving against the threats posed by ca-
ble."289 The dissent reasoned that Congress would not have taken care to
include such detailed findings directly in the statute simply to show that
broadcast television has some intrinsic value.290 With the content-based
character of the findings apparent on the face of the statute, it was irrelevant
to the dissenters whether Congress had additional, content-neutral purposes
for enacting the statute, because "[the Court] ha[s] often struck down stat-
utes as being impermissibly content-based even though their primary pur-
pose was indubitably content-neutral. 29'
287 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In reaching this con-
clusion, the dissenters noted that "[t]he First Amendment does more than just bar gov-
ernment from intentionally suppressing speech of which it disapproves. It also generally
prohibits the government from excepting certain kinds of speech from regulation be-
cause it thinks the speech is especially valuable." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). As a result, even if the must-carry provisions are not related to
the suppression of free expression, they are "related to the content of speech-to its
communicative impact." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221 (noting that giving tax breaks to
religious, sports, and professional magazines is not related to the suppression of
speech); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1980) (invalidating exemption for
labor picketers from a general picketing ban, even though the exemption is unrelated to
the suppression of speech); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
(same)).
288 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 2462);
see also supra note 232 and accompanying text.
29 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[I]t does not seem likely that Congress would make extensive findings merely to
show that broadcast television is valuable. The controversial judgment at the heart of
the statute is not that broadcast television has some value-obviously it does-but that
broadcasters should be preferred over cable programmers.").
29' Id. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Arkan-
sas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221 (striking down content-based exemptions in a
general revenue measure); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (striking down
content-based exemptions in a general anti-counterfeiting statute); Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (striking down on content discrimi-
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After concluding that the must-carry provisions are content-based, the
four dissenting Justices then subjected them to strict scrutiny review.292
"Content-based speech restrictions are generally unconstitutional unless they
are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest." '293 The dissenters con-
cluded that the interests in localism and diversity, although legitimate and
perhaps important, do not qualify as compelling state interests.294 In addi-
tion, without deciding the difficult question of whether the interests in edu-
cational and public affairs programming are compelling, the dissenters found
that the must-carry provisions are not tailored narrowly enough to serve
those interests because they burden cable programmers that offer educational
and public affairs programming, as well as cable entertainment program-
mers.295 With regard to the burden imposed on cable operators, the dis-
senters concluded that because the must-carry provisions are content-based
they constitute "an impermissible restraint on the cable operators' editorial
discretion .... "296 As a result, the four dissenting Justices determined that
the must-carry provisions infringed the First Amendment rights of cable
programmers and cable operators.297
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg went beyond their strict scru-
tiny analysis and stated that even if the must-carry provisions are content-
neutral, they still are invalid pursuant to intermediate scrutiny because they
restrict too much speech unrelated to "the content-neutral interests in fair
competition and the preservation of free television ...."298
nation grounds a general urban beautification statute); Carey, 447 U.S. at 466-68 (strik-
ing down on content discrimination grounds an ordinance aimed at preserving residen-
tial privacy)). "[W]hen a content-based justification appears on the statute's face, we
cannot ignore it because another, content-neutral justification is present." Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
292 Id. at 2478-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
293 Id. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
294 Id. at 2478-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggest-
ing that although the government may subsidize speakers who offer localism or a novel
point of view, it may not restrict other speakers who do not).
29 Id. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (naming
CNN, C-SPAN, the Discovery Channel, and the New Inspirational Network as exam-
ples of cable programmers that offer educational and public affairs programming).
296 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "For reasons related
to the content of speech, the rules restrict the ability of cable operators to put on the
programming they prefer, and require them to include programming they would rather
avoid." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1974)).
297 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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If Congress wants to protect those stations that are in danger
of going out of business, or bar cable operators from prefer-
ring programmers in which operators have an ownership
stake, it may do that. But it may not, in the course of ad-
vancing those interests, restrict cable operators and program-
mers in circumstances where neither of these interests is
threatened.299
Because in their view the must-carry provisions do precisely that, the three
Justices found the must-carry provisions to be "fatally overbroad."3 °° De-
spite the majority's contention that the record is insufficient to analyze prop-
erly the narrow tailoring component of the intermediate scrutiny test,
30
'
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg stated that "[n]one of the
factfmding that the District Court is asked to do on remand will change this
[overbreadth].*"3°2 According to these three Justices, even if on remand the
lower court learns precisely how many broadcasters would be in economic
jeopardy without must-carry privileges, the constitutional remedy will not
change: "Protect those broadcasters that are put in danger of bankruptcy,
without unnecessarily restricting cable programmers in markets where free
broadcasting will thrive in any event.""3 3 Based on this overbreadth, Justic-
es O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg believed that remand was not necessary
to find the must-carry provisions unconstitutional even pursuant to interme-
diate scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations."
C. Justice Blacknun 's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun filed a brief concurring opinion in order "to emphasize
the paramount importance of according substantial deference to the predic-
tive judgments of Congress .. . ."'0' Nonetheless, despite the extensive
legislative record compiled by Congress in enacting the 1992 Cable Act,
Justice Blackmun agreed that it was appropriate to remand for further devel-
opment of the record below. 6
29 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
0 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 See id. at 2472.
0 Id. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104 Id. at 2480-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305 Id. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)).
" Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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D. Justice Stevens' Opinion Concurring in Part and Concurring in the
Judgment
Justice Stevens went even further than the majority and concluded that
the lower court decision should be affirmed based on the current factual re-
cord."7 He, like Justice Blackmun, emphasized the substantial deference to
be given to the judgments of Congress 0 Such deference prevented him
from questioning Congress's decision to protect broadcast television from
cable's rapidly increasing market power before broadcast television is "in its
death throes.""a Although Justice Stevens' view required affirmance, he
concurred in the judgment vacating and remanding as an accommodation in
order to secure a majority disposition.31
E. Justice Ginsburg's Decision Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Ginsburg joined fully Justice O'Connor's opinion, but wrote
separately to stress her agreement with the dissenting opinion of Judge
Williams below.3" Justice Ginsburg noted that although the must-carry
provisions do not constitute viewpoint discrimination, they are content-
based."' Because the must-carry provisions prefer local broadcasters based
upon the content of their programming, and because they "hypothesize[] a
risk to local stations that remains imaginary," ' Justice Ginsburg joined
Justice O'Connor's opinion. 4
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Appropriate Standard of Review
The Court's selection of the appropriate standard of review turned pri-
marily on whether it viewed the must-carry rules as content-based or con-
tent-neutral regulations. 15 Content-based regulations can survive only if
307 See id. at 2473-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
308 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
311 Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
31 Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 57 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dis-
senting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)).
.1. Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
314 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3" The parties argued this issue partly based upon the similarity of cable television to
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the government can prove that they serve a "compelling" interest and that
they use "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest."3 6
Content-neutral regulations, however, will survive if they further a signifi-
cant government interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
31 7
Based on the specific design of the 1992 Cable Act's must-carry pro-
visions, they must be considered content-based. As Judge Williams noted in
.his dissent below,31 8 part of the reason that Congress chose to mandate the
carriage of local stations is their content-they are "an important source of
local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast servic-
es critical to an informed electorate. 31 9 In addition, the content of the pro-
tected programming is also prescribed by the FCC licensing requirements
that bind local broadcasters to "provide programming responsive to issues of
other media. The cable programmers and operators contended that cable should be
treated like newspapers, and thus the regulations should have been subjected to the
exacting scrutiny applied in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) ("It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time."). The government asserted that cable is more like
broadcast television, and thus the regulations should be examined pursuant to the less
demanding standard applied in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(allowing even content-based restrictions on broadcast television to survive review
based on the scarcity rationale). The Court, however, repeatedly has cautioned that
"differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them." Id. at 386. Based on this direction from the Court and
the difficulties of comparing the characteristics of different media relying upon different
technology, analysis of the appropriate standard of review can more easily be achieved
by applying the general standards used for content-based and content-neutral restric-
tions, while looking to the other media paradigms merely for guidance. The Court,
without explicitly citing this reasoning, adopted a heightened level of scrutiny for the
regulation of cable television, somewhere between the paradigmatic levels of scrutiny
given to newspaper and broadcast television regulations. See Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2469 (1994).
316 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
317 O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). A restriction is narrowly
tailored "so long as the.., regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation," even if it is not the least
restrictive means of promoting the interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798-99 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The
government may not, however, "regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals." Id. at 799 (citing
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("A~complete ban can be narrowly tailored
but only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted
evil.')).
318 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C. 1993) (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
3' 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(1 1).
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concern to [their] community. '320 Furthermore, the must-carry rules make
clear that the very act of asserting must-carry rights depends upon the con-
tent of the broadcaster's programming. 321 In addition, the legislative re-
ports concerning must-carry confirm the content-based nature of the
government's goals by asserting an interest in promoting particular types of
programming based on their content. 322 The must-carry provisions,
therefore, require cable operators to carry broadcasters which are compelled
by law to provide programming with a particular content as directed by the
government. Viewed in that light, the must-carry rules are clearly content-
based regulations.
320 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 57 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Commercial TV
Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1091-92 (1984) (report and order)).
32 In considering a request to alter the scope of a broadcaster's local market to in-
clude other communities, the FCC must consider whether the broadcaster "provides
coverage or other local service to such community" and whether other broadcasters
"provide[] news coverage of issues of concern to such community or provide[] ... cov-
erage of sporting and other events of interest to the community." 47 U.S.C. §
534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1992). Furthermore, the non-duplication rules allowing non-
commercial stations to assert must-carry rights are explicitly content-based in that the
carriage decision is based on whether 50% of a station's typical weekly programming is
distinct from the programming of another noncommercial station. See 47 C.F.R. §
76.56(a) (1990). In addition, in order to qualify for must-carry rights, low power televi-
sion stations must broadcast "nonentertainment programming; programming ... involv-
ing political candidates, election issues, controversial issues of public importance, edito-
rials, and personal attacks; [and] programming for children," and the FCC must deter-
mine that the low power station would "address local news and informational needs
which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast stations . .. ."
47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). In other words, if the content of program-
ming provided by full power stations does not meet the needs of the local community,
then low power stations can assert must-carry rights if their programming contains the
appropriate content.
See H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1992) ("[M]andatory car-
riage of noncommercial television stations would further th[e] important goal" of "in-
creasing the amount of educational, informational, and local public interest program-
ming available to the nation's audiences . . . ."); see also id. at 69 ("Local public televi-
sion stations also provide a variety of special services to their communities, including
local news and public affairs programs, programs offering outlets for local cultural and
artistic groups, and coverage of local and state government activities and personali-
ties."); id. at 51-52 (noting that there would be a reduction in local news and public
interest programming without mandatory carriage requirements).
323 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("Mandating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the
speech."). The must-carry rules cannot be considered content-neutral because they are
not justified "without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Ward, 491 U.S.
at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)). The broadcasters that are given preferential treatment are specifically defined
based upon the content of their speech; if they did not broadcast content required by the
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The Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary is unconvincing. First,
the Court divorced the provisions dealing with low power stations and oth-
erwise geographically ineligible broadcasters from the provisions dealing
with full power local broadcast stations,324 refusing to consider the other
provisions despite admitting that they appear to grant "special benefits on
the basis of content." '325 The same congressional justifications that the
Court believed supported the content-neutral character of the provisions
applicable to full power broadcasters, however, presumably were used by
Congress in support of the other provisions that the Court virtually admitted
were content-based. The Court placed heavy emphasis on the detailed statu-
tory findings in holding the purpose behind the must-carry provisions to be
content-neutral,326 but if ostensibly content-neutral findings could result in
some facially content-based provisions, then why not others? The majority
completely ignored the provisions concerning eligibility requirements and
low power stations, notwithstanding their value as "strong evidence of the
statute's justifications. 327
In addition, the majority noted that the must-carry provisions confer
privileges in a manner unrelated to content.32 "The aggregate effect of the
rules thus is to make every full power commercial and noncommercial
broadcaster eligible for must-carry, provided only that the broadcaster oper-
ates within the same television market as a cable system. 329 In order to
obtain a license to operate within a particular television market, however,
those broadcasters must "provide programming responsive to issues of con-
cern to their community."330 This content-based licensing requirement,
however, suspiciously was absent from the statutes and regulations cited by
the Court in order to demonstrate the FCC's "minimal" influence over the
content of the programming offered by broadcasters.33'
Furthermore, it is incorrect to assert that the must-carry rules are merely
economic restrictions because they only regulate the means of delivery of
speech-the broadcasters' video signals-rather than the speech itself.332
FCC licensing rules, they could not be local broadcasters.
324 See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460 n.6.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 2461-62.
321 Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
328 Id. at 2460.
329 Id. (emphasis added).
330 See Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 58 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Commercial TV
Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1091-92 (1984) (report and order)).
331 See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463-64.
332 See, e.g., id. at 2460 (stating that the must-carry provisions distinguish between
speakers based only on the manner in which they transmit their messages); Turner, 819
F. Supp. at 40 (characterizing the must-carry rules as merely economic regulations
rather than regulations of speech).
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Other regulations, such as the grant of public rights-of-way to lay cable,
deal with the means of delivery of the video signals. The must-carry rules,
however, dictate the identity of the signals that are delivered, based on the
local programming content of those signals. Furthermore, even the economic
goals of the regulations are defined to further particular programming based
on its content, in that the regulations are designed to "ensure the economic
viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality
local programming." '333
Despite Judge Jackson's attempt to distinguish Riley v. National Fed-
eration of the Blind34 in the lower court opinion,335 that case provides
solid guidance against viewing the must-carry provisions as merely inciden-
tal burdens on speech. In Riley, the Court struck down a law that limited the
fees that professional fundraisers could charge to charities because it re-
stricted both groups' "ability to speak." '336 The Court rejected the argument
that the law was merely an economic regulation having an incidental burden
on speech, stating that "[flar from the completely incidental impact of, for
example, a minimum wage law, a statute regulating how a speaker may
speak directly affects that speech." '337 Similarly, the must-carry provisions
must be viewed as direct, not incidental, restrictions on speech because they
directly affect the choice of programming that a cable operator may trans-
mit. In fact, the interest asserted by the government in Riley was the pre-
vention of fraud,33 which relates less directly to speech than does the pro-
motion of local programming through must-carry.339 If the statute in Riley
was a direct burden on speech, then surely the must-carry provisions are as
well.
Another reason to examine the must-carry provisions using strict scru-
tiny is that they interfere with the editorial discretion of cable operators.34
The FCC has previously acknowledged that "cable operators now function
as independent media voices exercising broad editorial control over con-
... 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(16) (emphasis added).
33- 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
331 See Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 42. See also the Supreme Court's cursory treatment
of Riley. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
336 Riley, 487 U.S. at 794.
331 Id. at 788-89 & n.5. Although the Court rejected the argument that the economic
purposes of the statute in Riley were sufficient to warrant a relaxed level of scrutiny,
this is precisely the reasoning used by Judge Jackson in his lower court opinion. See
Turner, 819 F. Supp, at 42.
338 Riley, 487 U.S. at 788.
... See Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 31-32 n.52,
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44).
3' Although the Supreme Court rejected this contention, it did so based upon its
belief that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464-
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tent," and that the "editorial function whereby cable operators select and
tailor their program mix... is akin to that performed by publishers of print
media."34 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that cable operators
are engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment and are, in much
of their operations, part of the press.342 These declarations seem to call for
the use of the almost insurmountable scrutiny applied to restrictions on the
editorial discretion of newspapers.343 Such virtual per se unconstitutionality
should not be carried over from newspapers to the cable television medium,
however, because the government has played a role in creating and main-
taining monopolies in the cable industry.3" This factor creates a difference
between the newspaper and cable industries-a difference that counsels
against expanding Tornillo beyond the newspaper industry. The limit on
editorial discretion in this case, however, is still a content-based restriction
because the limit is being placed on the discretion to deny carriage to sta-
tions broadcasting local content. As such, strict scrutiny remains the appro-
priate standard of review.
The appropriateness of using strict scrutiny is best demonstrated by the
dilemma caused by choosing whether to interpret the must-carry provisions
as a preference for local broadcasters or for local broadcasting. If the provi-
sions mandate carriage of local broadcasting, then they clearly are based on
the content of what is being broadcasted and should be reviewed using strict
" In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of
Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864, 879-80
(1986). In fact, in concluding that the previous must-carry rules should be discontinued,
the FCC conceded that must-carry "protects one segment of the television industry by
substantially limiting the ability of others to offer service to consumers." Id. at 880.
342 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
141 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 ("It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with the First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to
this time.").
'44 Other than the economies of scale associated with entering the cable industry,
local monopolies for cable television occur largely as a result of the government's elab-
orate system of franchise requirements for cable operators. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542
(Supp. IV 1992). When the government grants a franchise, a cable operator normally
"enjoys a virtual monopoly over its area, without the threat of an alternative provider."
Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1550 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). Furthermore, analogizing to broadcast
television and radio, when the government grants a communicative monopoly to a sin-
gle speaker, it has the power to regulate speech in order to ensure at least minimal
levels of diversity of speech and speakers. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); see also Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). Cable television, however, does
not share in common with these media the limitation of physical scarcity of the electro-
magnetic spectrum. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny.345 If instead, however, the must-carry rules are targeted toward
local broadcasters, then they constitute a naked preference for the speech of
one group by restricting the speech of another group.346 The government
would be choosing which speakers are to be heard, directly contravening the
principle that "[t]he constitutional right of free expression is ... intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us ... .""' Such content-based distinctions between groups of speakers
are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of their neutrality toward any ideas
expressed.34 Either formulation of the must-carry rules, therefore, leads
directly to strict scrutiny.
B. Application of the Test
The must-carry rules can survive strict scrutiny only if they are designed
to serve a "compelling" government interest and use "the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest." '349 The government, however, did
not assert that the must-carry rules could survive this level of scrutiny;
rather, it argued that strict scrutiny did not apply.35° Analysis of the regula-
tions using the intermediate level scrutiny of O'Brien,35" ' however, demon-
strates that must-carry cannot even survive that more permissive standard.
As a result, even after finding the must-carry provisions to be content-neu-
tral, the Supreme Court should have reversed the lower court decision and
declared the must-carry provisions unconstitutional.
To pass muster pursuant to intermediate scrutiny, the government first
must demonstrate that the must-carry provisions further a significant gov-
... See supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text.
346 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."). The Supreme Court distin-
guished Buckley because of its belief that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral.
Given that local broadcasters are required by the FCC to broadcast local programming
content in order to qualify for a broadcasting license, see Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 58
(Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Commercial TV Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1091-92
(1984) (report and order)), that distinction fades away.
... Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971)). "[F]ree and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the govern-
ment." Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988).
348 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
149 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
350 See Brief for Federal Appellees at 30-33, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44).
351 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a discussion of O'Brien's intermediate scrutiny test, see
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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ernment interest."' The government's asserted interests are, broadly, pro-
moting diversity in programming and preserving free local broadcasting. 53
Assuming arguendo that these interests are significant, it is less clear wheth-
er the must-carry rules further them. 54 As for the interest in diversity, in
the absence of must-carry "programming choices have... grown about 50
percent" since the court in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC.55 invalidated
the previous attempt at must-carry rules. 6 These figures strongly suggest
that must-carry rules do not contribute to diversity as the government as-
serts. Furthermore, even if still more diversity is the goal, the FCC has
found previously that cable programming contributes substantially to diversi-
ty in video programming.35 Why is it more diverse to have ten channels
showing local news rather than nine channels of local news and CNN? Why
are five local noncommercial educational channels more diverse than four
such channels and the Discovery Channel? The government has failed to
sustain its burden of demonstrating that the must-carry rules further the
interest of promoting diversity in programming; rather, it seeks to ensure
that local broadcasters are heavily represented in the overall diversity of
programming that already exists. This objective is closely related to the
government's second asserted interest-preserving free local broadcasting.
The interest of preserving free local broadcasting clearly will be fur-
thered by rules requiring that cable operators carry stations with local pro-
gramming content. The difficulty arises, however, when the must-carry rules
are examined to determine whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve
that objective. Although narrow tailoring does not require use of the least
restrictive means available, "[g]overnment may not regulate expression in
352 Id. at 377.
. See generally 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a), (b).
3-4 Even pursuant to review under the O'Brien test, the government bears the burden
of showing that its asserted interests "[are] sufficiently substantial to justify the effect"
of the regulation on protected speech. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984). Furthermore, the government must
show more than an unsubstantiated assertion of the importance of its interest, see Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72-73 (1981); it "must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real" rather than mere "speculation or conjecture," Edenfield v.
Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 & n.12 (1993) ("[W]e require the government goal to be
substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated.") (quoting Board of Trustees of the
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
355 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
356 S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
311 See In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage
of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Sys., 1 F.C.C.R. 864, 880 (1986);
Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 145, 196-221 (1985); see also In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council
against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, N.Y., 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5051-54 (1987).
1994] 759
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not
serve to advance its goals." '358 An examination is necessary, therefore, into
what portions of the must-carry rules advance the goals of preserving free
local broadcasting.
In this case, the must-carry rules are "substantially broader than neces-
sary" '359 to achieve the government's goals. Broad prophylactic regulations
are suspect in the area of free expression; "[p]recision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious free-
doms."'3" Here, Congress has adopted a broad prophylactic rule that grants
special carriage privileges to all local broadcasters in an effort to remedy the
perceived economic danger to such broadcasters, 6' rather than restricting
the regulation to communities in which local broadcasting actually faces
extinction. The number of local broadcasters and their profitability have
both increased substantially in the absence of any must-carry rules since
Quincy was decided in 1985.362 To achieve the goal of preserving free lo-
cal broadcasting, presumably only broadcasters facing financial difficulties
would need special carriage rights. Regulation protecting all local broadcast-
ers regardless of their popularity or economic well-being, therefore, is sub-
stantially broader than necessary to achieve the goal of preserving local
broadcasting.
Other provisions of the must-carry rules also indicate their
overinclusiveness. If a noncommercial educational station is not available
locally, a cable operator is required to import the signal of another from
non-local communities.363 This carriage requirement, by definition, does
not advance the goal of preserving free local broadcasting-it specifically
mandates carriage of a broadcaster from a non-local market.3" In addition,
the retransmission consent 65 option given to broadcasters demonstrates
38 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citing Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)).
... Id. at 802 (quoting Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984)). The regulation may target "no more than the exact
source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
" Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1803-04 (1993) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
36, For a discussion of the Congressional findings concerning danger to the economic
viability of local broadcasting, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
363 47 U.S.C. § 535(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
364 This provision reinforces that the must-carry rules are content-based-they are
aimed at the protection of local broadcasters rather than local broadcasting because this
provision protects local content of programming in general, even though the station is
not local to the particular community into which it is imported. See supra notes 318-48
and accompanying text.
361 If broadcasters do not choose to assert their must-carry rights, then cable opera-
tors may not broadcast their signals without first receiving consent to do so. See supra
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that the must-carry rules are substantially broader than necessary. In enact-
ing retransmission consent, Congress realized that many local stations are
strong enough and popular enough that cable operators would pay them for
the privilege of carrying their signals. Although such stations surely are not
in need of the protection of must-carry, the must-carry rules apply to them,
allegedly in order to preserve the "economic viability"3" that they so
clearly already possess.
The must-carry rules also are substantially overbroad because they seek
to preserve free local broadcasting based on Congress's belief that cable
operators are engaging in "anticompetitive conduct" '367 despite evidence to
the contrary. Congress found that because of the vertical integration of cable
operators who increasingly offer their own programming and the competi-
tion between cable and local broadcasters for advertising revenue, cable
operators have an incentive to deny carriage to local broadcasters.368 As a
result, Congress enacted must-carry rules, which apply to all cable opera-
tors, regardless of their individual treatment of local broadcasters or whether
they own any cable programming.369 Congress did this despite acknowl-
edging that it had "not found that cable systems are engaging in a wide-
spread pattern of denying carriage" to local broadcasters.37 In addition, the
vertical integration of the cable industry does not, in reality, provide an
incentive for cable operators to drop local broadcasters. Cable operators
derive the overwhelming portion of their revenue from subscription fees,
rather than from advertising revenues.37" ' Moreover, "broadcast program-
ming that is carried remains the most popular programming on cable sys-
notes 83-87 and accompanying text. In effect, Congress gave broadcasters the license to
nullify the asserted government interest in preserving local broadcasting by withholding
their signals from cable operators unless the broadcasters are paid or granted other
privileges.
" See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(16).
367 See id. § 2(a)(17).
368 See id. § 2(a)(13)-(16).
" Judge Williams noted in his dissent that the leased access provisions, 47 U.S.C. §
532 (1988), are much more appropriate to target the supposed dangers of vertical inte-
gration. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 61 (D.D.C. 1993)
(Williams, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). If Congress
is concerned that cable operators will grant preferential treatment to programmers with
whom they are affiliated, then the appropriate remedy is to empower unaffiliated broad-
casters, not local broadcasters. Congress presumably already has done so with the
leased access provisions, rendering must-carry rules unnecessary to counter vertical
integration in the cable industry. The must-carry rules, therefore, clearly are not targeted
to "eliminate[] no more than the exact source of the evil [they] seek[] to remedy."
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
370 H.R. REP. NO. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992).
17' See Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 64 (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that the ratio of
subscription fees to advertising revenue is twenty-five to one).
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tems, and a substantial portion of the benefits for which consumers pay
cable systems is derived from the carriage of the signals of network affil-
iates, independent television stations, and public television stations."3"' The
true economic incentive for cable operators, therefore, is to attract as many
subscribers as possible by offering the most appealing programming
available.373 Furthermore, since must-carry ended in 1985, ninety-four per-
cent of all cable operators carried all local stations that would have qualified
for carriage pursuant to must-carry, and ninety-eight percent of all local
stations were being carried.374 Clearly, in presuming an incentive for cable
operators to drop local broadcasters, Congress failed to "demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real" rather than mere "speculation or conjec-
ture.13
75
As a result of these deficiencies, the must-carry rules are substantially
broader than necessary to serve the government's interests. Given that over-
breadth, they are not tailored narrowly enough to further the interests assert-
ed by Congress.376 Must-carry rules do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny,
therefore, and they surely must fail when reviewed with strict scrutiny. As a
result, given a second chance to address the must-carry provisions on re-
mand,377 the District Court panel should recognize that the must-carry
rules violate the First Amendment rights of cable operators and program-
mers.
372 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(19).
373 See Brief for Appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al. at 44, Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (No. 93-44).
374 S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1991) (referring to NATIONAL CABLE
TELEVISION Ass'N, BROADCAST STATION CARRIAGE SURVEY 8 (1988)).
37' Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993). Although deference is due to the
legislative findings of Congress, "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judi-
cial inquiry when first amendment rights are at stake." Sable Communications v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 843 (1978)). Courts must exercise their "independent judgment of... facts
bearing on an issue of constitutional law ... ." Id.
376 See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 802 (1989)
(defining narrow tailoring).
377 Although the Court did not believe that the record contained any "findings con-
cerning the actual effects of must-carry on the speech of cable operators and cable
programmers," see Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2472
(1994), the record apparently was sufficient enough to allow Judge Williams below to
find that many cable programmers will be dropped from cable systems because cable
systems serving one-third of all subscribers do not have any excess channel capacity.
See Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 59 n.3 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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VII. CONCLUSION
With its ruling in Turner, the Supreme Court determined the appropriate
level of scrutiny to be used in reviewing must-carry provisions. The Court
did not blindly adopt the standard used to review restrictions on other me-
dia, such as the exacting scrutiny of Tornillo or the relaxed scrutiny of Red
Lion Broadcasting.37 Each new medium presents a unique set of factors
based on different uses of technology, and as technology quickly evolves the
First Amendment must do its best to keep up with it. Accordingly, restric-
tions on cable television must be reviewed pursuant to a standard suited for
its unique attributes. That standard is one of heightened scrutiny. In turn, the
particular rigorousness of the standard must be based upon whether the
regulation under review is content-neutral or content-based.
Although content-neutral regulations affecting cable television should be
evaluated with a more forgiving standard, the must-carry rules at issue in
Turner are content-based restrictions on the First Amendment freedoms of
the cable industry. Congress granted a special privilege to local broadcasters
based on the content of their programming, mandating that cable operators
carry their signals regardless of the cable operator's wishes. Must-carry is
not economic regulation designed to regulate the means by which video
signals are carried; rather, it dictates which signals a cable operator must
carry. Congress sought to protect local programming content, but it tried to
do so at the expense of the First Amendment freedoms of cable operators
and programmers.
This sweeping directive was based on Congress's desire to protect local
broadcasters from extinction as a result of so-called "anti-competitive con-
duct" engaged in by the cable industry. All evidence, however, suggests that
local broadcasters are thriving in the absence of must-carry rules. Although
Congress found that cable operators have an incentive to deny carriage to
local broadcasters because they compete for advertising revenue, cable oper-
ators derive the overwhelming majority of their revenue from subscription
fees, giving them the incentive to offer the most popular mix of program-
ming available. Because local broadcast stations are among the most popular
stations carried by cable systems, it is in cable operators' economic interests
to carry local broadcast stations. A danger to the economic viability of local
broadcasting simply does not exist.
The fatal flaw in the must-carry provisions is that Congress enacted
them in a grossly overinclusive and content-based manner. Ostensibly,
Congress's goal was to protect broadcasters in danger of economic ruin and
broadcasters unaffiliated with cable operators. They sought to achieve that
goal, however, by protecting many more broadcasters than those which fit
378 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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into either of these categories. Targeting local broadcasters for protection
based on the content of their programming is unacceptable. Targeting unaf-
filiated broadcasters in financial distress regardless of the content of their
programming may be acceptable, if crafted narrowly enough. Although the
Supreme Court already has determined that the must-carry provisions in the
1992 Cable Act are content-neutral, on remand the lower court should rec-
ognize that they are "fatally overbroad" '379 and decline to uphold them.
... Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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